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ABSTRACT
Awareness of children who experience
unexpected difficulty in the acquisition of
motor skills has increased dramatically over the
last twenty years. Although the positing of a
distinct syndrome has proven seminal in
provoking further questions, several basic
terminological problems remain unresolved. In
this paper, we conduct a component analysis of
the three, principal competing labels for this
disorder, two of them being elements derived
from systematic diagnostic frameworks. Our
preference for the DSM IV term Developmental
Coordination Disorder (DCD) is stated and
justified. Problems in diagnosis are discussed,
especially in relation to the etiology-dominated
medical model. We argue that an attempt should
be made to identify (pathological) positive signs
that can reliably be detected rather than relying
entirely on normative evidence of a lack of
skills exhibited by other children of the same
age. The high degree of overlap between DCD
and other developmental disorders suggests
that DCD might not constitute a distinct
syndrome. In this context, we emphasize the
need to determine whether incoordination takes
a different form when it occurs alone or
whether it is combined with general
developmental delay or with other specific
disorders in children of normal intelligence.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been recognized for a long time that severe
and persistent difficulties in spoken language, reading
and wrRing, attention and motor coordination, not
infrequently occur in children of normal general
intelligence without any obvious neurological disorder,
who come from an unremarkable family background,
and who have apparently adequate schooling and
other educational experiences (Rutter, 1998, p.ix).
In this paper, our concern is with such
unaccountable failures within the domain of motor
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skills acquisition and, in particular, what to call
this disorder and how to arrive at a systematic
diagnosis. Everyday motor skills are not generally
as dependent on formal tuition as is, say,
mathematical problem-solving or reading aloud.
Many actions that we perform in everyday life
have been learned informally and can be
performed without close attention. Indeed, under
normal circumstances, we become aware of the
intricate coordination required by our actions only
when suddenly deprived of our skill, as in the
attempt to fasten buttons with icy fingers.
Interestingly, the colloquial term ’clumsy’, used of
unskilled action, derives from a Middle English
word expressing the idea of numbness. Cold
fingers as a prototype for incoordination, may have
a lexicographic precedent, because, as Partridge
(1961) has pointed out, the Middle English clumsed
bears a striking morphological resemblance to
clumsig, a Swedish dialect word carrying the sense
of numb with cold. A reminder of the movement
skills we take for granted is also furnished by the
child who cannot acquire even the simplest motor
skill without help. Being unable to fasten one’s
buttons or to ride a bike to school might seem
trivial disabilities, but it is now well established
that such failures can exercise far reaching
consequences (see below).
Figure shows examples of deficient graphic
skills taken from two children, both aged 9 and
with at least a normal IQ. Neither child showed
any sign of a central language disorder; both had
fluent, accurate speech and read well above their
age level. The children came from supportive home
backgrounds and attended caring schools. Their
parents and teachers were concerned about how
Fig. 1: Examples o.f defective graphic skills drawn from two children with general movement problems.TERMINOLOGICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC ISSUES IN DCD
these difficulties might affect the child’s progress
in school. The advice of pediatricians was sought
but they could offer neither a satisfactory explana-
tion of the child’s difficulties nor a solution to the
problem. Although the deficiencies shown in
Fig. should be evident to anyone experienced in
children’s handwriting, no frozen view of the
graphic product can rival in clinical richness the
experience of watching the child struggle to
generate that product.
Although the awareness of children with
difficulties of this sort has greatly increased over
the last quarter century, much remains to be learned.
In particular, improvements in the assessment of
the condition and a greater awareness of its likely
accompaniments and possible consequences have not
been matched by a commensurate improvement in
our understanding of the functional architecture that
supports normal competence or the biological and
computational bases of deficient skill.
Terminology
The debate about the appropriate label for a
disorder might seem to be of purely ’academic’
interest. Nevertheless, the choice of terms has
important implications, both theoretical and
practical. In research, for example, terminological
ambiguities create difficulties in the definition and
comparison of samples. In the realm ofthe practical,
a condition defined by society in one way may
confer special entitlement to benefits and services,
whereas the same condition defined in a different
way may not. Labels, moreover, tend to be adhesive,
and can therefore be difficult to shed, even when
the child has changed for the better. Such issues
are addressed in an admirably succinct series of
editorials in the journal Developmental Medicine
and Child Neurology (for example, Bax, 1999;
Davies, 1994; Gardner-Medwin, 1995; Hart, 1999;
MacKeith, 1968).
Recent reviews on the labeling of the disorder
concerning us here have concluded that terminology
continues to present a problem (Henderson &
Barnett, 1998; Polatjako, 1998). To some extent,
the variations in labels are systematic, differing
characteristically from country to country, from
profession to profession, and even according to the
theoretical bias of the individual. Surveys by
Missiuna & Polatajko (1995), Miyahara & Register
(2000), and Peters et al., (2001) have shown that
certain professionals view the competing labels as
interchangeable, whereas others employ different
labels for different groups of children. In Sweden,
such children are nearly always assigned the label
Disorder of Attention and Motor Performance
(DAMP), (for example, Gillberg, 1992; Gillberg &
Gillberg, 1989; Gillberg et al., 1989). Transported
to Italy, the children become Dyspraxic (Zoia,
1999), whereas in Holland most turn out to have
Developmental Coordination Disorder (Geuze et
al., 2001). Many Australian practitioners, indifferent
to fashion, still use the term Minimal Neurological
Dysfunction (Larkin, personal communication). In
New Zealand, however, Developmental Dyspraxia
is more common (Miyahara & Register, 2000). In
Canada, 6 years after the ironically named
’Consensus Forum’ (Polatajko et al.1995), the term
physical awkwardness continues to enjoy popularity
amongst educators. In the United States, too,
different professions employ labels of their own,
but for parents seeking private services, insurance
companies recognize Developmental Coordination
Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994)
(APA), opening their coffers only when the DSM
IV diagnostic criteria are fully met. The situation
in the United Kingdom (UK) is unresolved.
Whereas some therapists and teachers are devoted
to the term dyspraxic, others use the term DCD
(Peters et al., 2001). In contrast, the UK National
Health Service (NHS, 1999) has recently been
considering the possibility that all hospital records
should adhere to the World Health Organization
(WHO) classification scheme. Consequently, theS.E. HENDERSON AND L. HENDERSON
condition would then bear the catchy WHO title
Specific Developmental Disorder ofMotor Function
(SDD-MF) (ICD 10, 1992).
At the London (Ontario, Canada) Consensus
Forum, researchers and practitioners from a wide
range of disciplines were able to reach agreement
that the term DCD should be universally adopted
(Polatajko et al. 1995). In what follows, we
reconsider the issues in terms of a component
analysis of the three main contending labels:
Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD),
Specific Developmental Disorder ofMotor Function
(SDD-MF) and (Developmental) Dyspraxia. Whereas
DCD and SDD-MF have a relatively formal status,
due to their APA and WHO provenance, and are
linked, as we shall see, to a diagnostic framework
(albeit underspecified), Dyspraxia has a more
popular appeal, due in part to its ’medical’
resonance. The term has never, to our knowledge,
been linked to a systematic set of diagnostic
criteria. Neither the APA nor the WHO has
attempted to justify their choice of term. Instead,
both organizations assert, somewhat gnomically,
that (a) the classification scheme adopted and the
terminology used is not based on theory but on
clinical expertise, (b) terms derived from contro-
versial theories have been avoided, and (c) the
current state of knowledge of childhood disorders
rules out reference to etiology or pathophysiology.
If only this agreement on strategy had yielded an
agreed label!
The overriding reasons for declining to adopt
the term dyspraxia to encompass the sort of
unexpected failure to acquire adequate motor skills
with which we are here concerned are twofold: the
longstanding confusion about the meaning of the
term ’apraxia’ in the literature on acquired
disorders, and the questionable relevance of this
literature to the developmental disorder.
It is not difficult to find neurological patients,
who, when asked: "show me how you wave
goodbye" are unable to do so, but then do so
spontaneously, as they depart. The prevailing
uncertainty about the nature of this disability was
advertised by an unhealthy proliferation of labels,
such as ideational, ideomotor, and constructional
apraxia, or dressing, gaze, and limb apraxia, and
so on. Perhaps in reaction to this, the literature on
the apraxias has recently tended to become more
empirical, attempting to tie detailed neuropsycho-
logical description of the impairment to patho-
anatomy (for example, Square et al., 1997). Such
locationalist objectives, however worthy, are
unlikely to commend the program to those who are
primarily concerned with psychological develop-
ment. Moreover, the attempts to define apraxia
continue to generate confusion, ranging from over-
inclusive to excessively narrow formulations.
Over-inclusion may be instanced by Rothi and
Heilman’s (1997, p. 3) definition: "a neurological
disorder of learned purposive movement skill that
is not explained by deficits of elemental [sic!]
motor or sensory systems." Narrowness is evident
in the strangely common assertion that apraxia
may be regarded as a disorder of gesture.
Apparently, apraxic difficultieswhatever their
naturedo not involve a disturbance in the co-
ordination of movement (but see Poizner et al.,
1997). Instead, widely agreed is that the defect is
located at a higher level in the hierarchy of action
control, in which either the planning of action or
the retrieval of action plans has become unduly
context-dependent, in that the patient can perform
only the act of waving good-bye in ’natural’
circumstances. Conversely, in our clinical experience
children with a developmental impairment of
movement who exhibit the sort of difficulties found
in apraxic adults are vanishingly rare. In the great
preponderance of cases of such a disorder, incoor-
dination is the most obvious feature presented.
Those who continue to advocate the adoption
of the label developmental dyspraxia as an
umbrella term in face of these problems risk
appearing to be motivated by political rather thanTERMINOLOGICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC ISSUES IN DCD
by scientific considerations or to have been
seduced by the medical resonance of the term
praxis. The persistent belief that studies of the
acquired disorder will somehow nurture the
understanding of the developmental condition (for
example, Ayres et al., 1987; Denckla, 1984; Dewey,
1995) seems to survive any amount of
disappointment. Finally, note that the distinction
between developmental and acquired disorders has
somehow become entangled with the distinction
between the prefix dys- (signifying disturbance of)
and the prefix a- (denoting absence of).
The remaining (APA, WHO) contenders both
stem from a tradition in which all developmental
disorders were labeled as ’specific’. With the advent
of DSM IV (1994), the APA departed from this
usage, abandoning the whole notion of specificity.
The broader issue was one in which children’s
learning difficulties were held to be specific only
if their achievements fell below what might have
been expected on the basis of their general aptitude.
The underlying assumption was that specific
disorders differed in nature from a more global,
developmental delay. Over the last decade, this
idea has been severely challenged in many domains,
particularly in those of language impairment and
dyslexia (see Bishop, 1998, Dowdney & Scott,
1998; Rispens et al., 1998; Yule, 1998, for
penetrating reviews). Sadly, it remains untested in
the motor domain.
So, how are we to proceed? Pragmatism suggests
that, from a research standpoint, we should continue
to employ some sort of discrepancy criterion in the
selection of participants, if only to avoid dipping
deeply into the murky etiological soup of profound
retardation. This approach is not a principled
adoption of the specificity notion, however, nor is
it an endorsement of IQ as a divine basis for the
calculation of discrepancies (see also Geuze, et al.,
2001). We are leaming from other domains that in
clinical practice, the discrepancy concept has little
role to play in deciding who should receive inter-
vention and what the nature of that intervention
should be (see, for example, Stanovitch, 1998, on
reading). As Bishop has observed of the language
domain, "...there seems little justification for
continuing to place heavy reliance on ’IQ-language’
discrepancies in determining who should receive
extra help at school" (Bishop, 1998, p. 146).
The inclusion of the term developmental in
both manuals serves to remind us ofthe longitudinal
perspective, encompassing, in Rutter’s eloquent
words "...not only the roots of behaviour in prior
maturation, in physical influences (both internal
and external), and in the residues of earlier
experiences, but also the modulations of that
behaviour by the circumstances of the present"
(Rutter, 1980 p. 1). Although now well established,
the notion that most children with movement
difficulties will spontaneously out grow them is ill-
founded (for example, Cantell et al. 1994; Geuze &
Borger, 1993; Henderson, 1993; Losse et al. 1991).
Without intervention, the educational, social, and
psychiatric consequences can be substantial (for
example Hellgren et al., 1994; Hellgren et al.,
1994; Hellgren et al., 1993; Skinner &Piek, 2001).
Nevertheless, we cannot predict with any degree of
accuracy which child will grow out of the problem
or which will become seriously depressed. Only
further research will help us to disentangle the
complex interactions between organic and environ-
mental factors that might affect the course ofDCD.
If one crucial aspect of the term developmental
is reference to the interplay of biological with
personal and social factors in the child’s progressive
mastery of its environment, another must surely be
the contrast between disorders that are due to the
child’s failure to learn and those in which a once-
learned skill has been traumatically lost. In the
developmental disorder, the most basic of skills
such as reaching, grasping, standing, and walking
can be intact but more complicated acts like cutting
with scissors or catching a ball represent entirely
novel tasks that are often acquired only with theS.E. HENDERSON AND L. HENDERSON
utmost difficulty. This situation contrasts markedly
with adult conditions in which the same complex
skills can be performed with perfection until
disaster strikes.
A disorder of...what?
Whereas DSM IV considers the answer to this
question to be motor "coordination", ICD-10 speaks
of a disorder of "motor function". The Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) defines the termfunction
as activity (or) action in general, whether mental
or physical. A possible disadvantage of the term
function is that it leaves open the possibility that a
child has poor motor function for reasons unrelated
to his/her ability to control the motor system. For
example, some children with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) appear clumsy
because they are inattentive rather than actually
incapable of performing the required actions.
Physical weakness, consequent on a muscle-
wasting disease, can also impair motor function
without being a primary disorder of motor control.
In contrast to the term ’function’, the term
’coordination’ seems to refer more directly to the
heart of the problem while at the same time
remaining fairly neutral as to detailed causality.
The Collins English Dictionary defines the verb to
coordinate as "to oganize or integrate diverse
elements in a harmonious operation". The OED
entry, on the other hand, emphasizes the sequential
nature of the movement elements of which most
actions are composed" "consisting of a number
of actions or processes properly combined for one
purpose".
Within the scientific literature on motor control,
the definitions of coordination vary considerably
in their level of discourse. For Schmidt (1988), the
term occurs at a level involving individual joints
and muscles. Thus, he defines coordination as the
"behaviour of two or more joints and muscles in
relation to each other to produce skilled activity".
Gallistel (1980), in his monumental treatise The
Organization ofAction, takes a broader perspective,
(see especially Chapter 8). His main preoccupation
in this work was identifying the principal functional
units that contribute to sustained purposive action.
He discusses three types (reflexes, oscillators, and
servomechanisms) and considers how they can
interact to produce a larger vocabulary of actions.
Then, in a key passage, he argues, "These diverse
modes of interaction do not, however, by
themselves ensure the coherence of coordinated
action." This coherence depends upon a
hierarchical structuring of the units. By this means,
"the highest levels of neural integration impose an
overall direction on behaviour." (p. 210).
For Gallistel, coordination is a feature that
takes place throughout the hierarchy of action control.
Opposing muscles must be activated or inhibited
to produce movement of a limb. This parallel
selection may be modulated over time, as in
oscillator-driven movement, requiring the coor-
dination of temporal patterns. Such patterns can, in
turn, be selected or deselected by a higher level
decision-making system, in light of environmental
data, and so on, up the hierarchy. We can quite
properly speak of coordination at each hierarchical
level. As we ascend the hierarchy, information
from the environment becomes increasingly
important so that not only the components of the
movement have to be coordinated but also the
actions have to fit the coordinates of the
environment. The grasping hand has to be shaped
to accommodate the arriving ball. At each new
level, coordination will exhibit new properties of
fluency, appropriateness, and expertise.
In sum, four attractive features emerge from our
examination of the term coordination.
First, the notion ofintentionality is embraced.
Second, our attention is drawn to the spatial
and temporal organization of actions.
Third, we are reminded that most actions
involve the sequencing of movement elements.TERMINOLOGICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC ISSUES IN DCD
Fourth, we are also reminded that actions have
to be appropriately calibrated to environmental
coordinates.
Given our implacable hostility to a formal linkage
of the developmental disorder to those acquired
disorders referred to as apraxias, our approval of
the term coordination as a descriptor ofthe demands
of movement control at various hierarchical levels
and the eschewal of the problematic notion of
specificity, we cannot do other than endorse the
label DCD.
DIAGNOSIS
In DSM IV, a disorder is conceptualized as a
clinically significant, behavioral or psychological
syndrome that is associated with an impairment in
one or more important areas of functioning. A
syndrome can, in turn, be regarded as a set of co-
occurring signs and symptoms indicative of a
particular ’disease’. In medicine, diseases are
diagnosed in terms of a pattern of abnormal signs
and symptoms, sometimes assigned different
weights and not all of which may be present in a
given case. In well-understood diseases, the
etiology is known and defines the disease and
specifies any underlying pathophysiology. An
effective therapy stems from understanding the
etiology, whereas failure of this therapy constitutes
a prima facie reason for doubting the diagnosis.
Thus, for example, for a condition such as
congenital hypothyroidism (a genetic condition
resulting in a hormonal deficit), doctors have
available to them a proactive screening program
leading to early diagnosis and, in consequence, to
a rapidly instituted treatment. If treatment is
instigated early enough, the catastrophic effects on
cognitive and on motor development are averted
(see Fig. 2). We mention the admirably clear
Fig. 2." What makes doctors happy? Congenital hypothyroidism as a prototype of medical diagnosis. (Reprinted with
permission of Professor Hilary Cass).S.E. HENDERSON AND L. HENDERSON
TABLE 1
The four DSM IV diagnostic criteria for Developmental Coordination Disorder.
A. Performance in daily activities that require motor coordination is substantially below that expected given the
person’s chronological age and measured intelligence. This may be manifested by marked delays in achieving motor
milestones (for example walking, crawling, sitting), dropping things, ’clumsiness’, poor performance in sports, or
poor handwriting.
B. The disturbance in Criterion A significantly interferes with academic achievement or activities of daily living.
C. The disturbance is not due to a general medical condition (for example cerebral palsy, hemiplegia, or muscular
dystrophy) and does not meet the criteria for a Pervasive Developmental disorder.
D. Ifmental retardation is present the motor difficulties are in excess ofthose usually associated with it.
medical disease model precisely because it tells us
so little about the diagnosis of DCD. In this, our
inspiration might have been that of Artemus
Ward’s celebrated Lecture, of which the author
remarked that its principal virtue was that:
"...it contains so many things that don’t have
anything to do with it" (Browne, 1865).
Consider the diagnostic guidelines for DCD
offered in DSM IV (Table 1). Four criteria are
applied. Two are inclusive (the criteria must be
satisfied if the diagnosis is to be assigned), and
two are exclusive (meeting the criteria entails
rejection of the diagnosis).
Criterion ’A’ states that a child’s performance
in daily activities that require motor coordination
must be substantially below that expected given
his or her chronological age and IQ. The term
substantially is often operationalized as meaning a
score on a standardized test of motor performance
lying more than two standard deviations below the
age norm. According to Geuze et al. (2001) (and
who are we to dispute it?) the Movement ABC
(Henderson & Sugden, 1992) is now the test most
widely cited in the literature for this purpose.
Here, however, we must interject the observation
that the extant standardized tests vary greatly in
breadth of content. Consequently, one cannot
assume that identical scores on different tests are
directly comparable (Crawford et al., 2001; Dewey
& Wilson, 2001; Geuze et al., 2001; Tan et al.,
2001). In our view, a test like the VMI (Beery,
1982), for example, is too narrowly based to serve
diagnosis, unsupported, and this is reflected in a
low correlation with broader based tests (for
example Jongmans et al., 1998). Criterion ’B’ is
much more difficult to operationalize, requiring
the assessor to judge whether the deficit interferes
to a significant extent with academic achievements
or with the activities of daily living (for example,
Watkinson et al., 2001 ).
Criterion ’C’ states that the deficit must not be
due to a medical condition like cerebral palsy and
must not satisfy the diagnostic requirements of the
generally debilitating group of disorders known as
pervasive developmental disorders (which include
autism). Finally, Criterion D states that, if mental
retardation is present, the motor difficulties must
be greater than those to be expected on that basis
alone (for extensive reviews of these criteria and
their application, see Henderson & Barnett, !998"
Dewey & Wilson, 2001; Geuze et al., 2001).
How does this kind of diagnostic protocol
deviate from the classic medical model? In acquired
disorders of movement like Parkinson’s disease,
the cardinal symptoms include positive features,TERMINOLOGICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC ISSUES IN DCD
such as resting tremor and ’cogwheel’ rigidity, that
are present in patients but not in healthy individuals,
as well as negative features like abnormal slow-
ness of movement, where the patient lacks the
speed of movement available to the healthy
individual). In contrast, the performance features
specified in DSM IV(R) for DCD are not
pathological and can only be said to be abnormal
in a statistical sense.
Positive features are not, however, the preserve
of acquired disorders. The obsessional interests
and stereotypies of autism and the hyperactivity of
children with ADHD seem to have discriminable
positive aspects. If positive symptoms could be
said to characterize DCD, then they might comprise
an awkward or influent style of performance, an
aspect of performance we can all observe and
agree on but that is difficult to assess with any
objectivity. Another very interesting possibility is
that in DCD, difficulties with motor control might
exert demands on attention resources and working
memory that are not present in children whose
development is normal. The lack of agreed
positive features means, however, that diagnosis
has to be based on norm-referenced test items that
yield a continuous measure of performance, such
as time spent balancing on one leg, for which we
can derive statistically determined cut-off points.
If the signs and symptoms of DCD do not
comprise a distinct set of pathognomic features,
we can still enquire whether they form a cohesive
pattern at a functional level. Like schizophrenia,
DCD is of unknown etiology and lacks a biological
marker. Nevertheless, the symptoms of schizo-
phrenia do seem to form two distinct clusters. A
set of positive symptoms (abnormal by their
presence), such as hallucinations and delusions,
consists of features in which reality testing has
broken down in a manner unknown to normal
individuals. In contrast, the negative signs
(abnormal by their absence) of schizophrenia are
characterized by the lack of attributes like
motivation or expressions of emotion, present in
normal individuals. Crude though it may be, this
distinction has been a fertile source of further
hypotheses about the action of neuroleptic medi-
cation, the chronic effects of institutionalization,
and the possibility of subtypes.
Within the literature on DCD, a number of
studies have attempted to define subtypes of the
disorder (for example, Dewey & Kaplan, 1994;
Hoare, 1994; Jongmans, 1993; Macnab et al., 2001).
In our view, however, none of the subtypes
proposed have been properly validated and there
is, as yet, no really persuasive evidence to suggest
that the motor features form cohesive and
contrasting clusters. One problem is the lack of
general theories in the motor domain that delineate
important distinctions between tasks, in terms of
their processing requirements. Although, in the
construction of most standardized tests, some
attempt has been made to include a range of items
that straddle an intuitive taxonomy of everyday
actions, these different types of test item cannot be
said to reflect theoretically-motivated distinctions,
of a similar status, say, to that drawn in research
on reading, between the processing requirements
of printed words whose pronunciation can be
assembled by phonographic rules (d/o/g "dawg")
and those requiring lexical retrieval (two "tooh").
Another problem is the lack of conclusive
evidence that the features of DCD, as a whole,
comprise a set that is reliably distinguishable from
the features of other developmental disorders. The
notion of separable syndromes implies that each
disorder constitutes a discrete clinical entity. This
issue is sometimes expressed in the question of
whether coordination difficulties amount to a
syndrome or are merely a symptom. In this regard,
concern with what sort of creature DCD might be
reflects wider doubts about the whole idea of
specific developmental disorders as distinct and
independent clinical entities. These doubts are
nicely captured by two quotations from the recent10 S.E. HENDERSON AND L. HENDERSON
literature that have a remarkable consonance:
"Those with highly specific deficits are the exception
rather than the rule" (Hill et al., 1998, p. 656).
"Comorbidity is the rule, rather than the exception"
(Kaplan et al., 1998, p. 484).
In the limited space available, we shall mention
just two studies that address these issues, in rather
different ways. The first surveys a substantial
portion of the territory of comorbidity, the second
concentrates on the nature and extent of motor
difficulties in children with DCD and in a quite
different disorder, Asperger’s syndrome.
In 1998, Kaplan and colleagues in Canada
examined over 200 children, who had been referred
to their clinic for attention problems or learning
difficulties. All were tested ’blind’ on measures of
cognitive ability, literacy, attention, and motor
performance, and strict criteria were adopted for
each of three specific learning difficulties. Only
children with an IQ over 75 were included. This
examination was not an epidemiologic study, and
it is not entirely clear to what population it can be
generalized. Nevertheless, the results are very
thought provoking.
As Fig. 3 shows, 115 children met the admission
criteria for at least one of the three developmental
disorders. Of these children, only a minority (46%)
were ’pure’ cases. Indeed, one in five actually met
the criteria for all three diagnostic categories. Of
special interest to us here is that the proportion of
children exhibiting co-morbidity was particularly
high for children with motor problems. Of a total of
81 children exhibiting coordination difficulties,
over two thirds (68%) were diagnosed with
multiple disorders. From the data, Kaplan et al.
concluded that it was likely that a variety of
leaning disabilities could occur when the early
DCD Developmental Coordination Disorder.
ADHD Attention Disorder Hyperactivity Disorder.
Fig. 3: Venn diagram of co-morbidities, showing number ofparticipants meeting strict criteria for dyslexia,
developmental coordination disorder (DCD), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), in isolation
and in combination, out of a total sample of224 children referred for leaming/attentional difficulties. Data
redrawn from Kaplan et al. 1998, with the permission ofthe publishers.TERMINOI,OGICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC ISSUES IN DCD
development of the brain was disrupted. The
specific pattern of the deficits that resulted,
however, would depend upon the site and the
extent of the damaged neural substrate.
Before we abandon the notion of discrete
syndromes entirely, however, it seems worth
enquiring whether the motor difficulties
experienced by these various groups of children
are really identical in nature and extent or whether
the difficulties take a discernibly different form
when combined with another disorder. Were this
the case, then knowledge of the precise nature of
these differences might enhance our ability to
differentiate between different developmental
disorders.
This very question is posed in a more narrowly
circumscribed domain by an investigation in which
we have recently been involved. Essentially, the
work is directed toward a comparison between two
developmental disorders that appear to share a
component of motor impairment but are very
different in other respects (Green, 1997; Green et
al., 2002). One group comprises children assigned
a diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome by very
experienced pediatricians, using ICD-10 criteria.
The other group was assigned the diagnosis DCD,
also by appropriately qualified and experienced
professionals. Although the clinical literature on
Asperger’s syndrome abounds with descriptions of
movement difficulties, we must note that these
played no role in the formal diagnosis.
We compared the severity of the movement
deficit experienced by these two groups and
explored the possibility that the nature of the
deficit might differ in the two groups. To this end,
we examined the profiles of the children on the
Movement ABC, as well as various aspects of their
performance on a gesture test. Because Asperger’s
syndrome is thought to involve defective sociali-
zation, we also sought to detect any differential
effect of social pressure on motor learning and
performance in the two groups. So far, we have
found no evidence that clumsiness was more
severe or took a systematically different form in
DCD when it was not accompanied by the features
of Asperger’s syndrome than when it was.
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